


17TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE
ON PERSONS

July 22-26, 2024



Katholische Akademie in Berlin



KATHOLISCHE AKADEMIE
IN BERLIN e.V.

17th International Conference on Persons

Organizing Committee

Richard Allen, British Personalist Forum (UK)

Randall E. Auxier, American Institute of Philosophical and Cultural Thought/
Southern Illinois University Carbondale (USA)

James Beauregard, Rivier University (New Hampshire, USA)

Jan Olof Bengtsson, Independent Scholar, Stockholm (Sweden)

Juan Manuel Burgos, Asociación de Española de Personalismo (Spain)

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Laura J. Mueller, West Texas A&M University (USA)

Diana Prokofyeva, St. Petersburg Electrotechnical University (Russia)

Olav Bryant Smith, California State University Chico (USA)

Local Arrangements and Host:

Stephan Steiner, Katholische Akademie in Berlin

Conference Registration: July 22, 12:00-2:00 PM (for those arriving late, please see Stephan Steiner)

Monday, July 22, 2024, 2:00 PM

Welcome and Conference Information:

Stephan Steiner, Katholische Akademie in Berlin

Randall Auxier, Southern Illinois Univ. Carbondale (USA)

Chair and Introduction:

James McLachlan, Western Carolina University

Opening Keynote Address

“Emergent Personhood and Moral Realism”

Kevin Schilbrack

Appalachian State University (North Carolina, USA)

3:20-3:30: Break

MONDAY SESSION 1, 3:30-5:00

1A: From a Psychological Point of View

Chair and Discussant, Stephan Steiner, Katholische Akademie Berlin

“Dignity in the Modern World: A Personalist Investigation”

James Beauregard, Rivier University (New Hampshire, USA)

“What Makes a Personalist? Some Psychological Considerations”

Colin Patterson, Independent Scholar (Melbourne, Australia)

1B: Schelling’s Personalism: Early and Late

Chair and Discussant: James, McLachlan, Western Carolina University (North Carolina, USA)

“The Inception of Divine Personhood in Schelling’s *Identitätssystem*”

Vittorio Alves, Katholische Universität Leuven (Belgium)

“The Personalist Significance of Schelling’s Ecstasy of Reason”

Ariën Voogt, Protestant Theological University (The Netherlands)

5:00-5:15 Break

MONDAY SESSION 2, 5:15-6:45

2A: Immanence and Transcendence

Chair and Discussant: Olav Bryant Smith, California State University Chico (USA)

“The Mystical Element in Josiah Royce's Concept of Personhood”
Jason Bell, University of New Brunswick (Canada)

“The Person as a Principle of Integration and Transcendence”
Aldo Giacchetti, Pontificia Università Gregoriana (Roma, Italy)

2B: Becoming of Persons 1

Chair and Discussant: Trip McCrossin, Rutgers University

“Rethinking the Traditional Definition of Person”
Jiang Lu, Sun Yat-sen University Guangzhou (China)

“Mind the Person: A Constructivist Variant of the Constitution View of Personhood”
Tuomas Manninen, Arizona State University (USA)

6:45-8:00 Reception



Dinner on your own (list of restaurants available)



Tuesday, July 22, 2024, 9:00 AM

Chair and Introduction:

Randall Auxier, Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Keynote Address

“The Struggle for the Narrative in an Age of Dispossession”

K. Allison Hammer
Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Illinois, USA)

10:20-10:30: Break

TUESDAY, SESSION 3, 10:30-11:45

3A: Ontology and Its Accompaniments

Chair and Discussant, Daryl Hale, Western Carolina University

“An Ontology and Anthropology of the Imago: Implications for Human Behavior”
Marcia Pally, New York University (USA) and Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (Germany)

“Logical and Methodological Implications of the Concept of Person”
Rocco Sacconaghi, DePaul University (Chicago, USA)

3B: The Concept of Person

Chair and Discussant: James Beaugregard, Rivier University (New Hampshire, USA)

“A Thought Regarding Fission”
Trip McCrossin, Rutgers University (New Jersey, USA)

11:45-12:00 Break

TUESDAY, SESSION 4, 12:00-1:15

4A: Genius and Return

Chair and Discussant, Jove Jim Aguas, The Pontifical and Royal University of Santo Tomas, Catholic University of the Philippines

“Homo Sapiens - Homo Reditus”
Nikos Skuras, Pfarrer Spanische Pfarrei Aachen (Germany)

“Nicolaus Copernicus as a Genius in Faith and Reason”
Bogumił Gacka, The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (Warsaw, Poland)

4B: Person, Self, Mind, Life

Chair and Discussant, Randall Auxier, Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Illinois, USA)

“The Person as a Living System: A Bio-Inspired Framework Integrating Autopoiesis, Homeostasis, and Allostasis”

Walter Fontannini, Semmelweis University (Hungary)

“On Being, Being a Person, and Being a Person Displaced”

Christopher Edwards, Independent Scholar (Guelph, Ontario, Canada)

1:15-3:00: Lunch on your own

T U E S D A Y , S E S S I O N 5 , 3 : 0 0 - 4 : 4 5

5A: St. Thomas Aquinas’s Personalism

Chair and Discussant, Grzegorz Hołub, The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków (Poland)

“Christian Humanism and St. Thomas' Notion of the Human Person”

Jove Jim Aguas, The Pontifical and Royal University of Santo Tomas, Catholic University of the Philippines

“A Theory of Moral Status Based on Aristotelian-Thomistic Anthropology”

Anna Grace Kalvelage, Loyola Marymount University (Los Angeles, USA)

5B: The Existence of the Person

Chair and Discussant, Jason Bell, University of New Brunswick (Canada)

“Person, Existence and Truth in according to Luigi Pareyson”

Angela Maria Michelis, University of Turin (Italy)

Qualia and Persons: How Might They Be Related?

Krzysztof Pięta, University of Warsaw

4:45-5:00 Break

TUESDAY, SESSION 6, 5:00-6:15

6A: Personhood in Our Languages

Chair and Discussant, Jiang Lu, Sun Yat-sen University Guangzhou (Peoples Republic of China)

“A Critical Analysis of the Filipino Concept or Expression ‘Sapagkat Ako/Tayo ay Tao Lamang’ (I am/We are just human)”

Tirso T. Alcover (Jr.), The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (Warsaw, Poland)

“Wang Chong’s Epistemology of Heaven and Immortality”

Yong Lu, SWPS University Sopot (Poland)

6B: The Social and Cultural Person

Chair and Discussant: Chris Edwards, Independent Scholar, Guelph, Ontario (Canada)

"Can Kenneth Gergen Be Called a Digital Personalist?"

Dominika Jacyk-Manikowska, University of Wrocław

“Personalism in the Journalism of the Weekly *Today and Tomorrow*”

Piotr Grabowiec and Aleksander Krejckant, University of Wrocław

6:15: Dinner on your own



WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 2024, 8:30 AM

Plenary Panel: Juan Manuel Burgos’ *Personalist Anthropology*

Chair: Randall Auxier, Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Illinois, USA)

Speakers:

Grzegorz Hołub, The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków (Poland)

James Beauregard, Rivier University (New Hampshire, USA)

Response:

Juan Manuel Burgos, Universidad Villanueva; Asociación Española de Personalismo

10:00-10:15: Break

WEDNESDAY, SESSION 7, 10:15 - 11:45

7A: Transformation of Persons

Chair and Discussant: Rocco Sacconaghi, DePaul University (Chicago, USA)

“Artistic Inspiration and the Human Person: An Intimate Synthesis of the Physical and the Metaphysical”

John Hofbauer, Mount Saint Mary College (New York, USA)

“The View of ‘Person’ from Erich Fromm and Metropolitan Anthony Bloom: What’s in Common?”

Diana Prokofyeva, St. Petersburg Electrotechnical University (Russia)

7B: What Is Good for Persons?

Chair and Discussant, Carol Moeller, Moravian University (Pennsylvania, USA)

“What Is a Common Good?”

Katharina Nieswandt, Concordia University (Montreal, Quebec, Canada)

“The Human Person in Business and Modern Cooperative Enterprise”

Antoni Magdoń, University of Rzeszów (Poland)

11:45-12:00 Break

WEDNESDAY, SESSION 8, 12:00 - 1:30

8A: American Personalism

Chair and Discussant: Kevin Schilbrack, Appalachian State University (North Carolina, USA)

“The History and Roots of American Personalism”

Randall Auxier, Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Illinois, USA)

“American Personalist Roots and a Personalist Framework for Today”

Olav Bryant Smith, California State University Chico (USA)

8B: Higher Love

Chair and Discussant, Aldo Giacchetti, Pontificia Università Gregoriana (Roma-Italy)

“What Is Vedantic Personalism?”

Jan Olof Bengtsson, Independent Scholar (Stockholm, Sweden)

“From Garden of Eden to Garden of Gethsemane: Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Ethics of Incommensurability as a Justification of Loving as Critical Thinking”

Blaise D. Ringor, The Pontifical and Royal University of Santo Tomas, Catholic University of the Philippines

Wednesday afternoon and evening free



THURSDAY, JULY 25, 2024

THURSDAY, SESSION 9, 8:30-10:00

9A: Existence, Othering, and Persons

Chair and Discussant, Adam Chmielewsky, University of Wrocław

“The Other as Person: A Critical-Historical Genealogy of Othering the Woman”

Hannah Ajewole, Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw) and Southern Illinois University Carbondale (USA)

“Are Mortals Persons?”

Nathan Riley, Independent Scholar (Florida, USA)

9B: (8:30-9:45) The Feminine, the Masculine, and the Church

Chair and Discussant, Colin Patterson, Independent Scholar (Melbourne, Australia)

“Masculinidad y feminidad en el diseño originario de Dios (A la luz de la Teología del cuerpo de S. Juan Pablo II)” (Translation will be provided)

Armando Medina Vargas, Studium Teologicum Galilaeae (Israel)

10:00-10:15 Break

THURSDAY, SESSION 10, 10:15 - 11:45

10A: Becoming of Persons 2

Chair and Discussant: Jan Olof Bengtsson, Independent Scholar (Stockholm, Sweden)

Adam Chmielewski, University of Wrocław (Poland)

Seeing the Other as a Person: A Critique of Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition

Daryl Hale, Western Carolina University (USA)

"Persons, History, and Nature in Becoming Human"

10B: The Church and Its Legacy

Chair and Discussant: Bogumił Gacka, The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (Warsaw, Poland)

Kathryn Nijssen, Pontificia Università della Santa Croce, Rome

"Personhood in the Family: An Examination of Philosophical and Anthropological Perspectives through History and the Continued Relevance of the Family in the 21st Century"

Mariusz Boguszewski, The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (Warsaw, Poland)

"The Human Person at the Centre of the Aid Projects of Polish Church Charities"

11:45-1:30 Lunch on your own

THURSDAY, SESSION 11, 1:30 - 3:00

11A: Person and the Sources of Religious Insight

Chair and Discussant: Randall Auxier, Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Illinois, USA)

"The Person and the Open: A Levinasian Reading of Bergson's *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*"

James McLachlan, Western Carolina University

"The Personalistic Mariology of Joseph Ratzinger"

Tomasz Lewniewski, The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (Warsaw, Poland)

11B. The Person in Classical Learning

Chair and Discussant, Jason Bell, University of New Brunswick (Canada)

“Plutarch on the Role of Passions in a Person”

Jan Migenda, University of Bonn, University of Salerno (Germany, Italy)

“The Person from Living Being to Loving Being: The Historical Development of the Concept of Person from the Greek Tragedy to St Thomas Aquinas”

Walter Fontannini, Semmelweis University (Hungary)

3:00-3:15 Break

THURSDAY, SESSION 12, 3:15-4:45

12A: Personhood in Practice

Chair and Discussant, John Hofbauer, Mount Saint Mary College (New York, USA)

“We Are Each Other’s Medicine: Mutual Aid for the Common Good: Collective Well-Being through our Shared Personhood/Humanness”

Carol Moeller, Moravian University (Pennsylvania, USA)

“The Right to Grow Up: How U.S. Education Law Views the Personhood of Children”

Kelly Swope, Thomas More University (Kentucky, USA)

12B: Wojtyła and Stein

Chair and Discussant: Juan Manuel Burgos, Universidad Villanueva. Asociación Española de Personalismo

“The Will Reveals the Person: Karol Wojtyła and Psychology of Will”

Karol Petryszak, The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Kraków (Poland)

“Edith Stein and Karol Wojtyła: Phenomenology a Path toward Personalism”

Cristiana Dobner, Universidad de la Mística, Ávila España

4:45-5:00 Break

THURSDAY, SESSION 13, 5:00-6:30

13A: Personhood in Traditional Cultures

Chair and Discussant, Hannah Ajewole, Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw), Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Illinois, USA)

“Mirror of the Sacred Cosmos: The Notion of Personhood in West African Tradition”
Monika Brodnicka, Amherst College (Massachusetts, USA)

“Cherokee Governance from the Bottom Up?”
Carrie McLachlan, Western Carolina University (North Carolina, USA)

B: Person, Act and Being

Chair and Discussant, Marcia Pally, New York University (USA) and Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (Germany)

“The Person as Relational Reference to the Other: Between Theology and Philosophy”
Maciej Manikowski, University of Wrocław

“Personalistic Modeling”
Dominika Żukowska-Gardzińska, The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (Warsaw, Poland)

7:00 Conference Dinner



FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2024, 9:00-11:00

Closing Plenary Session: The Future of Personalism

Chair: Randall Auxier

Speakers: James Beauregard, Jan Olof Bengtsson, Juan Manuel Burgos, Bogumił Gacka, James McLachlan

Announcements: Publication, Upcoming Meetings, Organizational Plans

A B S T R A C T S
Alphabetical by Surname

Jove Jim Aguas <jsaguas@ust.edu.ph> The Pontifical and Royal University of Santo Tomas, Catholic University of the Philippines

“Christian Humanism and St. Thomas’ Notion of the Human Person” Today, the world has become more secular and individualistic. With the advance of science and technology, human capacities are exulted and praised. By harnessing our human capacities, we have reached unprecedented progress in technology, communication, medicine, and many other aspects of human life. Human agency and reliance on science make all this progress possible; consequently, the spiritual dimensions of human life are often ignored. Does it still make sense to believe in the spiritual and take a theistic view of human life? During the Middle Ages, the theistic view was the dominant position. St. Thomas Aquinas developed a theocentric philosophy that is consistent with divine revelation. However, in the modern world, a non-theistic view is the more acceptable position. In this paper, I show that a humanism centered on Christian belief is still a relevant and more acceptable proposition over modern and secular humanism. For St. Thomas, man has a spiritual component, and he is ordained towards God. He developed a Christian humanism anchored on theological personalism, a concept that emphasizes the unique relationship between each individual and God and how this relationship shapes our understanding of human dignity and purpose. This theological personalism distinguishes Christian humanism from secular humanism.

Hannah Ajewole <ajewolehannah@gmail.com> Polish Academy of Sciences/Southern Illinois University Carbondale

“The Other as Person: A Critical-Historical Genealogy of Othering the Woman” Gerda Lerner, in her book *The Creation of Patriarchy*, raised a question that I would like to start with; “if female subordination was not universal, then was there ever an alternative model of society?” Lerner disagrees with the cliché that an ideal matriarchy existed before patriarchy; the idea frequently obscures the agency and struggle of women in constructing their own histories. Rather than being a “fall” from grace, she suggests that patriarchy was an active “creation”—a non-calculated process by men to seize power as history gradually unfolds and creates “woman” as Other. In the words of Simone de Beauvoir, “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman,” in the sense that men have created. This implies that woman is limited to the role of the object and the Other, while men are viewed as the subject and the norm, and that otherness is a result of power dynamics and societal expectations rather than an innate trait. Thus, rather than originating from biology, “womanhood” is a social and cultural creation of femininity. In this paper, I will examine the otherness of woman from Lerner’s and Beauvoir’s perspectives.

Tirso T. Alcover, Jr., RCJ, <tirsojalcover39@gmail.com> The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (Warsaw, Poland)

“A Critical Analysis of the Filipino Concept or Expression ”Sapagkat Ako/Tayo ay Tao Lamang (I am/We are just human)” In this paper, I am going to present a critical analysis of the Filipino concept or expression “Sapagkat ako/tayo ay tao lamang.” (“I am/We are just human”). This emphasizes the lowliness of the human perspective that leads to the degradation of the *human person* with the result of wiping away of the dignity and honor of the human person. Every person is unique. Every person is adequately considered. Every person is an icon of the Image and Likeness of God (Genesis 1:27). Thus, this paper develops the importance of the *human person* and contributes to the factors that make the *human person* of prime importance with regard to his/her dignity. It aims to abolish the mentality of every Filipino who makes excuses by using the expression; such excuses do not erase the dignity, honor, respect, and

supremacy of the *human person* as created individual. Moreover, its objective realizes to some degree that *man* is capable of fault and sin, but it should not be the point of reference for excusing himself/herself of the fault by using those expressions; rather there should be a moment of conversion and to our real nature as good.

Vittorio Alves <vittorio.bortolaiaranhaalves@kuleuven.be> Katholische Universität Leuven (Belgium)

“The Inception of Divine Personhood in Schelling’s Identitätssystem” Schelling’s early substance monism has led commentators to categorically deny any trace of a personified deity in his *Identitätssystem* (Buchheim 2004, McGrath 2021). They argue that if God is the sole reality of things, there is no substantial difference between His being and that of creatures. Consequently, there is no free, transitive act of creation, let alone any space of communicability within which revelation could occur. Readings such as this rely on a relational understanding of personhood, where one is a person only to the extent that one reveals themselves through their actions. In this paper, I argue for a broader conception of personhood, along the lines of Tegtmeier (2023), where a person is one who is invested with subjectivity, i.e., an inner life characterized by a volitional component, a structure of self-consciousness, and the capacity for expressive behavior. I then show that all of these predicates are applicable to the God of the *Identitätssystem*, and that the latter is not straightforwardly Spinoza’s *Deus sive natura*. While Schelling does not yet adopt the language of full-fledged biblical personhood, the first important elements are already in place which will guide his dynamical path toward theological personhood in the *Philosophie der Offenbarung*.

Randall Auxier <personalist61@gmail.com> Southern Illinois University Carbondale (Illinois, USA)

“The History and Principles of American Personalism” I outline the background of American personalist philosophy and theology, drawing on the standard histories of personalism (Bengtsson, Burrow, Knudson). I trace these German roots through to the two primary schools of American personalist thought: the Boston University and the Harvard schools of personalism. The distinction between these two, while both are traceable to Lotze, has not been properly understood, but the differences are important. The Harvard school is often overlooked in the histories, or not recognized as a “school of thought,” which it definitely was and is. Also neglected is the pathway from James, Royce, and Hocking into European personalism by way of Max Scheler (James) and Gabriel Marcel (Royce and Hocking). Along the way I point to the major points on influence and divergence of the development of American personalism. I summarize the principles of both schools as well as the views rejected, both philosophical and religious, by American personalists.

James Beauregard <drjamesbeauregard@aol.com> Rivier University (New Hampshire, USA)

“Dignity in the Modern World: A Personalist Investigation” Human dignity has been a much-debated concept in contemporary times, ranging from views of its ongoing importance to opinions that it is a useless concept. One reason for criticism of the notion of dignity has been that the concept is too vague and does not have defined content. This paper presents an investigation, from the perspective of a personalist phenomenology (Seifert, Stein, Hildebrand, Merleau-Ponty) of the concept of dignity that attempts to address such concerns and to develop an adequate contemporary notion of dignity. The paper proceeds as follows: (1) A brief history of human dignity; (2) The contemporary literature on human dignity (philosophy, theology, law, bioethics); (3) Contemporary problems related to dignity; (4) A personalist phenomenological investigation of dignity. The investigation will examine dignity through instances of its violation in historical events of the 20th and 21st centuries, and through representative works of art (literature, the visual arts, film) with the goal of articulating a stable content for human dignity that can be brought into dialogue with the contemporary world across multiple fields, including politics, law, science, bioethics.

Jason M. Bell <jbell3@unb.ca> University of New Brunswick (Canada)

“The Mystical Element in Josiah Royce’s Concept of Personhood” I first consider Josiah Royce’s description of philosophical mysticism; second, his criticism of it; third, the mystic element that he preserves after a rejection of full-on philosophical mysticism; and finally, the way in which a ‘reduced’ mystical account makes an ongoing contribution to personalistic, phenomenological, and pragmatic philosophy.

Jan Olof Bengtsson <janolof.bengtsson@outlook.com> Independent Scholar, Stockholm (Sweden)

“What Is Vedantic Personalism?” At three of our international conferences on persons we have had presentations on what in my paper at the last one, in Mexico City in 2022, I called “Vedantic personalism.” I focused on the identification of the difference between the Vedantic understanding of the identity of the self, on a general level, and the basic characteristics of the original Christian understanding of the human being that is accepted in most western personalism. But is there really such a thing as Vedantic personalism? Personalism and the term person have not normally been associated with Hinduism and especially not with Vedanta. In this paper, I analyze and explain, in a broad historical perspective, how it has become possible to speak of Vedantic personalism, how it seems to me it should be understood, and what sets it apart not only from Christian personalism but from the main current of Vedanta.

Mariusz Boguszewski <m.boguszewski@uksw.edu.pl> The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University

“The Human Person at the Center of the Aid Projects of Polish Church Charities” The human person at the center of the aid projects of Polish Church charities is an issue that responds to the aid directions of the three organizations: Caritas, Aid to the Church in Need, and Knights of Columbus. These three organizations represent a large number of Polish organizations implementing national and international projects, targeting those most in need. The selection of the most urgent and possible projects is a difficult task and often involves the rejection of others. The most common reason for rejection is lack of funding or lack of prospects for effective use of the grant awarded. Hence, determining, already at the initial decision-making stage, to whom to grant funds is a choice, often, between a great or even greater human tragedy. Determining who is the person most in need qualifies Polish, Church-based charities to be at the forefront of noting, above all, the human dimension of needs and the feasibility of projects.

Monika Brodnicka <mbrodnicka@amherst.edu> Amherst College (Massachusetts, USA)

“Mirror of the Sacred Cosmos: The Notion of Personhood in West African Traditions” Most West African conceptions of personhood, derived from various religious traditions, describe the essential role of the esoteric dimension in human identity. Yet, discursive methodologies often leave out or, at least, marginalize the spiritual aspect so prevalent in these traditions. Amadou Hampâté Bâ attempts to reverse this trend and offer a much-needed mystical analysis, which serves as the best approach to interpret these realities. More specifically, Bâ’s analysis of Fulani and Bamana-inspired personhood points to both the sacredness and the multiplicity of human nature, which involves participation of all cosmic, spiritual forces. The philosophical implications of this paradigm reach far beyond multiplicity, however. Paradoxically, they reveal the path toward sacred synthesis. As an interior multiplicity, the person is considered unfinished at the beginning, but moving toward completion of the manifold selves that constitute the universe. Therefore, the aspect of plurality in the concept of personhood is the springboard for the transformation of the person from a medium of chaotic forces to an equilibrium point, which ultimately leads to a microcosmic reflection of the universe in both its material and spiritual dimensions.

Adam Chmielewsky <adam.chmielewski@uwr.edu.pl> Univeristy of Wrocław

“Seeing the Other as a Person: A Critique of Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition” Among contentious issues in Axel Honneth’s social theory is the status of primary recognition as a ground for mutual relation between individuals. Intended as a foundation for more substantial forms of recognition of love, respect, and esteem, primary recognition was criticized as capable of accounting for inclusionary attitudes only and its inability to account for human negativity. This paper is a critical analysis of the principal claim of Honneth’s epistemology of recognition, which asserts an intrinsic relationship between perception and primary recognition. I argue that Honneth’s construal of primary recognition, based on mutually inconsistent claims concerning the relationships between perception and recognition, leads to a serious paradox. While primary recognition is conceptually necessary to explain recognitive attitudes, which are at the centre of his theory, it must be seen as a precondition of exclusionary attitudes as well. I contend that the paradox in Honneth’s theory may be avoided with the help of the concept of the regime of perception. The idea of the perceptual regime is outlined through reference to the philosophical critique of perception and its functioning is illustrated by the example of antisemitism as a radically exclusivist ideology and practice.

Cristiana Dobner <dobner@carmelitanescalze-concenedo.it> Universidad de la Mística, Ávila España

“Edith Stein and Karol Wojtyła: Phenomenology a Path toward Personalism” Can there be a point not only of comparison but of extreme closeness in the phenomenological and personalistic path of Edith Stein and Karol Wojtyła? It must be found in the intellectual formation of both, different but consonant: Edith Stein, with Husserl, mastered the phenomenological method, after the conversion she wanted to become a bridge between phenomenology and Thomism. The instrument of *Einfühlung* deeply influenced her intent to turn to the person. Wojtyła, of Thomist formation through Husserl’s student Ingarden, became aware of phenomenology and developed it in an original way, arriving at Personalism. Above all, however, they arrived at a conclusion I consider the goal of their life as scholars and believers, as well as saints. The thesis I support is the following: The *Einfühlung*, as a philosophical methodological tool, disappears from her writings after the conversion of Stein, but it is rediscovered in her last work: *Die “Symbolische Theologie” des Areopagiten und ihre sachlichen Voraussetzungen*. However, a change is notable: the *Einfühlung* was called the founding *Grundakt*. The relationship with God, however, does it not prove itself the *Grundakt*, the act of love par excellence? Does not the believer experiment with it in relation to the Man-Jesus? K. Wojtyła, while a teacher, presented Thomas Aquinas as the thinker who, referring to Aristotle, placed knowledge in the belief of emphasizing the likeness of man to God as a person. The Person, in its internal emotions, also included mystical emotions. So, if his Personalism is to be a person’s means to meet God in his own act, so the passage from a philosophical to a mystical tool, that is, from the Person of God to the created person, is a demonstrable fact. Phenomenology and its path toward Personalism: does it not show how the latter is an openness to mysticism?

Chris Edwards <guelph.edwards@gmail.com> Independent Scholar, Guelph (Ontario, Canada)

“On Being Displaced: A Spatiotemporal Articulation of Personhood” In *Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion*, William Blake describes a curious inversion of the intuitive configuration of two, geometric points of reference. “The Circumference is Within: Without, is formed the Selfish Centre.” (Plate 71) I will argue that this articulation describes the spatiotemporal discontinuity that identifies the voided position of a dislocated personal capacity or active agency, within the state or condition that we commonly describe as ‘personhood’. In this context, that spherical discontinuity identifies a personal point of view within a conscious space. This analysis is based on a curious pattern of dimensional components that is

generated by the periodic dislocation of an ongoing, neurological event. These components assume a coherent pattern of spatiotemporal relationships that configure a structure of four simultaneous events. This pattern of neurological effects is reflected in the structure of a conscious space. In this reflection, the personal position or point of view lies within the spherical discontinuity that articulates its interactive content and condition. This voided position is then reflected by the monadic discontinuities that articulate a particular content and its enveloping condition in our imaginative representations of experience. The veracity of this image is explained by an aesthetic sensibility that responds to the harmonic interactions that are generated by an active, neurological process and its own reflection. For example, is wave/particle duality a reflection of the conscious process that perceives it, or is this an apparent effect of a singular, cosmogenic process in which we participate as undifferentiated co-agents; where “life, the universe and everything” is actually a shared personhood?

Walter Fontanini <fontanini.walter@phd.semmelweis.hu> Semmelweis University (Hungary)

Person as Autopoiesis? The term autopoiesis (from αὐτο- ‘self’, and ποίησις ‘creation’, or ‘production’) refers to a system capable of producing and maintaining itself by creating its own parts. In biology, it describes how living systems self-organize and maintain their own internal order. The concept of the person as autopoiesis derives from the theory of autopoiesis developed by the biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980). This theory, initially applied to biological systems, has been extended in the social and psychological sciences to understand the nature of human beings and their self-construction. According to Gershenson (2014), autopoiesis can be defined as the relationship between the complexity of a system and the complexity of its environment; taking all this into account, this paper seeks to answer the following question: is the person an autopoietic system? Is the person as an autopoietic system that maintains its own internal world (thoughts, feelings, memories) while at the same time interacting with the social environment? Continuously regenerating itself, operationally self-contained –because its operations are determined by its own structure—and yet structurally engaged with its environment through social relations, normative and communicative acts, this person will offer a dynamic identity in a social system, emphasizing the agency of individuals.

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“The Person from Living Being to Loving Being: The Historical Development of the Concept of Person from the Greek Tragedy to St Thomas Aquinas” This lecture undertakes a comprehensive exploration of the concept of Person as it has been expounded from Greek tragedy and Roman legal-philosophical thought up to the Renaissance, with the persistent theme of unity embedded into a dynamic relationship inherent this concept. I delve more deeply into a lesser-known subject, namely the lines of transmission of knowledge from Greek to European culture, with particular reference to the line of the Syriac-Arabic school of translation in Baghdad, with obvious influences from Nestorianism, Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism. The syncretism of the translations from Baghdad to the Islamic school of Cordoba and the Catholic School of Tolosa, followed by further editing by Rabbi Maimonides, created a situation where instead of the original text of Aristotle, the commentary of Averroes was studied (Averroism); the situation was so confused that the Edict of Paris (1210), which forbade the study of Aristotle, came as no surprise. Aristotle's legacy, refined by the efforts of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, who commissioned William of Moerbeke to make a new translation directly from the Greek manuscripts, was later rediscovered in the original meaning of the Greek philosopher; the concept of person as relationship gives the title to this lecture.

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“Nicolaus Copernicus as a Genius in Faith and Reason” Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) was born in Toruń, Polish Prussia, on February 19, 1473. His father Nicolaus was a merchant and municipal official of Toruń. His mother Barbara was a sister of Lucas Watzenrode, who became a bishop of Ermland (Warmia) in 1489. Copernicus was baptized in the Church of St. John the Baptist and St. John the Apostle in 1473. Copernicus studied mathematics and astronomy in Cracow (1491-1495) and Bologna (1496-1500), visited Rome in the Jubilee Year (1500-1501), studied medicine in Padua (1501-1503) and received his doctor’s degree in Canon Law from the University of Ferrara (1503). After his studies he returned to Frauenberg, PL (Frombork) where he was installed as a canon (1501). As a genius in faith and reason Copernicus published his heliocentric system in *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* (Nürnberg 1543) with his Dedication Letter to Pope Paul III (pontificate 1534-1549) which was prepared in June 1542. He died in Frombork, near Gdańsk on May 24, 1543. In the Cathedral of Strasbourg, France there is the Astronomical Clock with Stimmer’s copy of a self-portrait of Copernicus standing with a sprig of lily-of-the-valley in his hand, indicating that he was also a doctor.

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“The Person as a Principle of Integration and Transcendence” Is it better to speak only of human beings, men and women, than to speak of persons? Some argue that it would be better to speak only of human beings, because the term person is a device of separation and exclusion (soul-body; persons, non-persons) (Cfr. Roberto Esposito). On the other hand, in the postmodern context a subjectivity fascinated by multiplicity is affirmed (Cfr. Gilles Deleuze) in which it seems no longer desirable to postulate some kind of unity of our inner world, in particular of our emotions, passions and affections, since all this would be seen as violence and imposition and, consequently, as an obstacle to the expression of what would constitute what is most proper to the human being. In the face of all this, we will seek to show that the person is a principle of integration and transcendence (Karol Wojtyła); of unification and personalization (Paul Ludwig Landsberg); of unity of body, soul and spirit (Edith Stein) and of transcendence in love (Dietrich von Hildebrand).

Daryl Hale <> Western Carolina University (North Carolina, USA)

“Persons, History, and Nature in Becoming Human” We live in a time when many feel estranged from, yet fervently desire, a genuine sense of community. Still, every conception of community demands a notion of person. Living human beings are spoken of as ‘persons’, distinct from non-human animals or things. However, recent political leaders insist on referring to some people as ‘animals’, ‘scum’, or ‘not even human’. One might dismiss this as merely adolescent ranting, except that this inflamed rhetoric often encourages followers to act violently against immigrants, indigenous peoples, and others. So, can we better grasp what counts as personhood? Can we live more authentically in an age of de-humanizing threats and actions? I begin by exploring Kant’s political idea of person, considering how that meshes with Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology. In an early work, Bonhoeffer contrasts his view of Christian personalism with that of earlier philosophical concepts of person. What Bonhoeffer argues for, then, and later in *Ethics* (through the concept of *Menschwerdung* [becoming human]) is for a new Christian humanism, which ought empower one to transform self and community to respond *responsibly* to any ‘tyrannical despoiser of humanity’. It is the responsible person, not the isolated defiant individual, who teaches us what real community is.

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“The Struggle for the Narrative in an Age of Dispossession” The twenty-first century has witnessed atrocities that have broken the promise of “never again” made after the Second World War and secured theoretically through the establishment of international laws and agreements. Alongside the deprivation of land and property is the struggle of the dispossessed to have their stories elevated above the lies and propaganda of the oppressors. Disinformation is not a novel tactic, but it takes on new proportionality in the digital public square. Given that democratic countries are perpetrating these crimes, this talk will assess the inadequacies of the eighteenth-century concept of inalienable rights as the basis for understanding dispossession, the denial of human rights, and the manufacture of so-called enemy-outsiders. Yet, this suppression of what Hannah Arendt called “truths of fact” is being actively exposed and refused. In Gaza, the narrative of the victims is being documented and shared, allowing viewers to bear witness. In the United States, censorship laws reject the reality of systemic anti-Black racism, but here, too, the fight for the narrative continues through public art and storytelling projects. Through this testimony, we will see that dispossession may be one keyword of our time, but truth can very well be another.

John Hofbauer <John.Hofbauer@msmc.edu> Mount St. Mary College (New York, USA)

“Artistic Inspiration & The Human Person: An Intimate Synthesis of the Physical & the Metaphysical” What is it that inspires a person to write poetry, to compose music, to craft sculptures, and, for that matter, to create any one of the numerous varieties of art? Is it simply for the sake of a distraction from seemingly omnipresent mundane occupations –thereby using art in a utilitarian fashion, as a type of invigorating elixir to cure our “work-a-day” woes, and to ‘charge our batteries’ for the next round of obligations? On the other hand, perhaps the inspiration transcends our ‘work-a-day’ world, and it “in-spires” precisely because it comes from “without,” i.e., from “the Other.” Above, and beyond the person, her work, society, and the universe itself? Perhaps, this inspiration is much more substantial, powerful, and profound – rendering it more universal in its appeal. It is our contention that the real thrust inspiring the artistic enterprise lies within the most ‘apparent’, and yet the most call mysterious, realm confronting man, viz., ‘being’ itself. In this paper, this claim will be justified by an exposition of the traditional, yet dynamic, approach to aesthetic theory used by neo-Thomistic thinkers such as Josef Pieper, Etienne Gilson, and Jacques Maritain. These philosophers posit some very plausible insights into what would ultimately constitute a “being-centered” philosophy of art. We will examine their approach by concentrating, initially, on the truly creative ‘secondary’ causality of the human artist, inspired as it is by the ‘primary causality’ of a divine Being. Afterwards, we shall examine the distinction between personal artistic expression as a purely utilitarian panacea, and artistic expression as a uniquely personal celebration of the plenitude of being as a ‘whole’ – a celebration, that is, of all that is good, true, and beautiful.

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“Review of Jian Manuel Burgos’ Personalist Anthropology: A Guide to Life” Juan Manuel Burgos’ book is a classic example of a well-written textbook on the philosophy of the human person. The quality of analysis and the translation itself stand at a high level. In the book, the author tries to present almost all aspects of the discussion on the human person; necessarily, he does so in a concise manner. Burgos draws on the work of many philosophers included in the personalist school of philosophy, but this does not detract from his own way of philosophizing. He is a personalist and is fully aware of his own philosophical approach to human personhood. In this review, special emphasis is placed on how Burgos draws on the

personalism of Karol Wojtyła. The former declares that his philosophical treatment of the person is largely inspired by the work of the Polish personalist. A critical analysis of the way Wojtyła is read and interpreted by Burgos is therefore fully justified. In general, it can be said that Burgos draws on Wojtyła's work in a fairly reliable way. However, some questions arise regarding specific theses, for example, how Burgos sketches the relationship between the person and nature. More broadly, he directs attention to the problem of how to reconcile thinking in terms of substance with the reality of the person.

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“Can Kenneth Gergen Be Called a Digital Personalist?” Can Kenneth Gergen, one of the most influential modern social psychologists, be called a personalist? This term was also attributed in the twentieth century to another great psychologist, the founder of logotherapy Viktor Frankl, so it would not be too shocking a thesis, but would it be legitimate? Moreover, given the content of the arguments that appear in one of Gergen's works, *The Saturated Self*, can he be thought of as a digital personalist? In my paper, I will argue for just such a thesis. I will briefly outline Mounier's source personalism. I will present what is peculiar and distinctive to him. I will then juxtapose Gergen's bundles of thought with Mounier and Frankl. In the final thesis, I will consider in what aspects Gergen's thinking is located near the sources of personalism, but in what aspects it is distant from it, and why.

Jiang Lu <jianglu.sysu@gmail.com> Sun Yat-sen University (Guangzhou, China)

“Rethinking the Traditional Definition of Person” Boethius's definition of person as “individual substance of a rational nature” is still widely influential today. Rationality is central to most of contemporary understandings of personhood. A striking observation is that especially philosophers of naturalist tendency tend to overstress this aspect, so that lack of sufficient degree of rationality will exempt infant human beings or mentally defect human beings from personhood, like Dennett did in his paper “Conditionals of Personhood.” This is due to the long-established connection of personhood with legal status and moral obligations. Only rational agents can be held legally or morally account for their actions. However, if rationality is taken as a criterion of whether a human being or non-born human being should be protected by law, things will get extremely confused as the discussion on personhood in bioethics demonstrates. But if we explore the relational dimension of personhood which is already implicit in Boethius, explored further by Aquinas, and present in works of Strawson and even Dennett himself, it will open the way to a new view of personhood that takes account of the concerns of care-ethics and leads to a deeper awareness of human dignity and the value of life in general.

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“A Theory of Moral Status Based on Aristotelian-Thomistic Anthropology” This paper explores the problem of moral status that arises from the ethical and ontological divide of ‘personhood’ in bioethics and attempts to answer the question of ‘personhood’ by proposing a theory of moral status based on Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology. I present the five main theories of moral status referred to in contemporary bioethics and distinguish these into dualistic and monistic views of the person. I then explain why each of these theories fails in their prescription of personhood, particularly theories based on a dualistic view and the severe implications that these theories hold for nature, non-human animals, and some human beings. I then build on a monistic view of the person in order to posit a theory of moral status based on

Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology. I use Thomas Aquinas' treatment of the souls and their powers in ST I q. 75-79 to argue that the possession of a rational soul is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for personhood. I suggest that we can use Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology as the foundation for a theory of moral status, and a foundational treatment of disability, that maintains that human dignity is found in human nature; however, I further argue that insofar as one has a soul, we can provide an analogical extension of personhood to non-human animals and plants. I argue that this kind of analogical extension of personhood to all living beings is necessary following the loss of the intrinsic value of being in the turn to modernity, and I conclude with a reflection on what is at stake in this debate, highlighting the implications that follow from the loss of the intrinsic value of being.

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“Personalism in the Journalism of the Weekly Today and Tomorrow” The peculiarity of Polish nationalism was based on its strong identification with Christian thought, above all with Catholicism, which had a strong influence on the shape of the identity of the national culture and fulfils, although to an ever lessening extent, the role of a public religion, as Jose Casanova rightly pointed out when he wrote that Polish Catholicism served as a public civic religion rather than a private religion of individual salvation. The seizure of power by the communists led to a situation in which some nationalist and Catholic activists adopted a strategy of survival, smuggling into their journalistic activities such personalist themes as could potentially be harmonized with the ideological line of the communist party. Such actions were contrary to the policy of the Church itself, in the persons of both Primate Cardinal Wyszyński and John Paul II. Therefore, the main aim of the article is to identify the themes drawn from Emmanuel Mounier's revolutionary personalism that can be identified in the journalism of the weekly *Today and Tomorrow*. The basic research question posed by the authors is whether the exposed ideas related to personalism were an element of the ideological identity of the weekly or merely a strategic and pragmatic choice of a way to survive in the reality of communist totalitarianism? A side objective, but also a very important one from the point of view of the analysis undertaken, is to establish the relationship between the exposition of personalistic philosophy in the weekly's journalism and the strengthening of the real socialist system in Poland in the years 1945-1956.

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“The Personalistic Mariology of Joseph Ratzinger” In his theology, Joseph Ratzinger presents the significance of Mary's person in mariology. His personalistic mariology is Christotypical and Ecclesiotypical. Mary is the Mother of God (*Mater Dei*) and the Mother of the Church (*Mater Ecclesiae*). Through a relationship with the person of the Virgin Mary, the Church Fathers saw the Church as a person, “the bride of the Lamb” (Rev 21:9). Ratzinger's personalistic mariology is a result of his relational personalism. Mary is a person in relations to the Divine Persons, to the angelic persons, and to the human persons.

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“The Human Person in Business and Modern Cooperative Enterprise” The human person is the subject and the goal of all social institutions because every person is the image of God (Gen 1:27). The Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Leo XIII as a defense of the inalienable dignity of workers strengthened the commitment to vitalize Christian social life, which was seen in the birth and consolidation of numerous

initiatives: groups and centers for social studies, associations worker organizations, unions, cooperatives, rural banks, insurance groups and assistance organizations. According to the Encyclical *Laborem Exercens* of John Paul II, which enhances the personalistic vision that characterized previous social documents, work is the “essential key” to the whole social question and is the condition for economic development and for the cultural and moral development of persons, the family, society and the entire human race. A significant example in this regard is found in the activity of so-called cooperative enterprises (*Hrubieszów*), small and medium-sized businesses, commercial undertakings featuring hand-made products and family-sized agricultural ventures. The economy and finance do not exist for their own sake, they are only an instrument or means. Their sole end is the human person and his or her total fulfilment in dignity.

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“The Person as Relational Reference to the Other. Between Theology and Philosophy” Relational thinking about the person emerged in modern thought through the philosophy of dialogue and personalism. However, it was already evident in many theologians and philosophers of the past, such as the Cappadocian Fathers, Richard of St. Victor or Thomas Aquinas, and today its champions are, for example, Ioannis Zizioulas, Cornelius Plantinga Jr., or Gisbert Greshake (and, in Poland, Józef Tischner). The relational conception of the person is based on seeing two spheres: the singularity or concreteness of man and the orientation toward the other man. To say it simply: we are born a human, but we become a person in relation to another. Thus, a person is a singular, concrete and unique being, and at the same time is an outgoing toward the other, which can be rendered in Greek philosophical terms –a person is *hypostasis* and *ekstasis* (ecstasy) at the same time.

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“Mind the Person: A Constructivist Variant of the Constitution View of Personhood” There is something of a consensus among philosophers that what makes persons unique is the self-consciousness they possess. Having self-consciousness allows persons to be ontologically productive –to create new kinds of entities in the world, like artifacts and institutions, which would not exist without persons. One recent theory that explores persons and their relation to the world is Lynne Rudder Baker’s “Constitution View,” as outlined in her papers “Persons and Other Things,” and “Human Persons as Social Entities.” However, despite its merits (which include acknowledging the need of language for personhood), Baker’s theory stops short of acknowledging the full extent to which persons are also products of such an ontology. In other words, I submit that persons are artifacts insofar as they depend on social conventions for their existence. In my essay, I will introduce the thought experiment of feral children as a challenge to Baker’s Constitution View of personhood. In brief, this thought experiment illustrates that in absence of social conventions, a human being does not naturally develop the traits of personhood. I will then move to offer an alternative way of developing Baker’s original formulation of the Constitution View that would allow it to account for these cases.

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“A Thought Regarding Fission” The Lockean picture of the nature of persons (1694ff) is subject to a familiar trio of objections, dating back as far as the Clarke-Collins debate (1704-06). Of the three, the fission problem is arguably the most notable. Locke himself recognized it, on the one hand, all the more interestingly for his lack of concern. On the other, it is the one over which the most, and indeed much contemporary ink has been spilled, beginning with Flew (1951), Parfit, a watershed (1971ff). A deflationary

perspective has arisen in response, Gendler's most notably (1998ff), that calls into question the imprudent reliance on the thought experiments involved, but it is at best out of step with their regular occurrence in popular culture, at least since Ely (1963) –and philosophy should strive to live in harmony with the popular imaginary. This essay explores a response to the fission problem based in three distinct considerations: (i) Wiggins' only-a-and-b rule (1967ff); (ii) the idea of possibilities arising only once others are realized; and (iii) the work it may do *vis-à-vis* popular culture and the popular imaginary.

Carrie McLachlan <carrie.mclachlan@gmail.com> Western Carolina University (North Carolina, USA)

“Cherokee Governance from the Bottom Up?” In Cherokee thought, the foundation of a “person” is corporate, not individual. For this reason, it was not easy for European leaders to understand Cherokee governance. Their preconceptions of how government should be structured, and the source of governmental powers were not applicable to the Cherokee system, which until the nineteenth century was primarily clan based. The power to make decisions was not invested in individuals; governmental power was retained by each clan, which was and is a group, not man-made, but foundational. Two aspects relating to Cherokee government that most perplexed European observers was the lack of coercive power on the part of their leaders, and the role women had in decision making. The latter, James Adair described as “petticoat government.” These two are related phenomena. Political “power” did not reside in appointed officials. Individuals were not invested with power to make decisions for the group. Those decisions had to be made by the clans through a process of consensus. The only power a leader had was the power of persuasion and the responsibility to bring the clans together. Political officials were male, but clan mothers were part of the councils who made decisions. Tom Belt, a Cherokee elder, has indicated that the voice of even the least powerful of the clan mothers was vital.

James McLachlan <jmclachla@email.wcu.edu> Western Carolina University (North Carolina, USA)

“The Person and the Open: A Levinasian Reading of Bergson’s Two Sources of Morality and Religion” Emmanuel Levinas, famously and unfashionably at the time, rated Bergson’s *Time and Free Will: A Essay on the Immediate Givens of Consciousness* one of the five greatest philosophical books. He also considered the most neglected of Bergson’s major works, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* to be an important text in which Bergson’s central notion of duration evolved into the impulse of human life. In his presentation “Inside Heidegger: Bergson” Levinas states: “But the vital impulse is not the ultimate signification of the time of Bergsonian duration. In *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, the duration that *Creative Evolution* considered as vital impulse becomes interhuman life.” In this paper I want to explore the relation of Bergson’s open religion to the Levinas’s claim that the other is an “infinite” that overflows that thought that thinks it. Contra Heidegger, Being does not exhaust the meaning of duration and in *The Two Sources* duration becomes interhuman. For Levinas this is one of the contributions of the notion of duration and the open as interhuman. It offers an alternative to Kantian ethics, it focuses on the concrete person, the other. Finally, Bergson offers a theology without a theodicy.

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“Person, Existence and Truth According to Luigi Pareyson” The question of the relationship between interpretation and truth is the underlying theme of significant theoretical studies by Luigi Pareyson, an Italian philosopher (1918-1991). This essay focuses on how Existentialism, Hermeneutics, and Truth are related to and at the center of Luigi Pareyson’s reflection in this work. But what existentialism? The cultural and philosophical context which formed Luigi Pareyson was that dominated by the last results of historicism

and neo-idealism, from which he moved away by criticizing relativistic and subjectivist assumptions. The philosopher was very young when he followed an itinerary which accompanied theoretical studies and the history of philosophy, to the formulation of a philosophical perspective which he called “ontological personalism,” and which first flowed into a philosophy of interpretation understood as an “ontology of the inexhaustible” and subsequently into an “ontology of freedom.” Beginning with his first works in 1950, in particular *Esistenza e persona (Existence and Person)*, the features of Pareyson’s speculation were already outlined, which rooted hermeneutics in existentialism and understood existentialism as “a resumption of the dissolution of Hegelianism.” Of particular importance are those studies published in the early 1970s in one of his best-known works, *Verità e interpretazione (Truth and Interpretation)*.

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“Plutarch on the Role of Passions in a Person” Ancient philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, when focusing on everyday ethics, considered the role of the passions in personal development. In this context also Plutarch of Chaironeia should be considered, although his moral writings are hard to classify and are overshadowed by his biographies. Considered an eclectic Middle Platonist, using not only Plato’s concept of moderation, but also Aristotle’s ethics (such as the doctrine of the mean), he seems to develop a loose concept of personality based on complex moral psychology within his religious worldview. He is known for his philanthropic stance and wide learning; his polemics against the Stoic concept of *apatheia* as well as Epicurean hedonism are quite harsh. This paper seeks to analyse the treatises *On the Control of Anger*, *On Tranquillity of Mind*, *On Talkativeness*, *On Being a Busybody* (from Book VI) and *On Love of Wealth*, *On Compliancy*, *On Praising Oneself Inoffensively* (from Book VII of the *Moralia*) as they make connections between personal passions and their influence on ethics. These questions are not often considered elsewhere in this much detail. The question is whether these ideas are sufficient to develop an integrative model of personhood, as *persona* was a concept developed by Cicero.

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“We Are Each Other’s Medicine’: Mutual Aid for the Common Good” Jonas Norgaard Mortensen’s book *The Common Good: An Introduction to Personalism* offers a 21st century Personalism aimed toward lives of individual and collective flourishing. Such ideals are almost unimaginable under current pessimistic views of: (A) what humans are like (selfish, threatening); and (B) what lives are possible (more individualist, predatory, capitalist grind on a dying planet of scarcity and competition). With Personalism, we might rather live with what Thomas O. Buford calls the “three core principles of Personalism: (1) “Humans are relational; (2) They engage; and (3) They have inherent dignity.” (Buford, “Foreword,” p. 7 of *The Common Good*.) Mutual Aid projects, like Personalism, enable the affirmation of persons, our value, and ways to change our lives toward conditions that support us. I introduce Mutual Aid and reflect on Mutual Aid projects. I build especially on Dean Spade’s book *Mutual Aid: Building Solidarity During this Crisis (and the Next)*. Three key elements of Mutual Aid are (1) “they work to meet survival needs and to build shared understanding about why people do not have what they need;”; (2) they “mobilize people, expand solidarity, and build movements”; and (3) they “are participatory, solving problems through collective action rather than waiting for saviors.”

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What Is a Common Good? There are social groups for which most people would think that they have some sort of joint good, such as a romantic couple. Starting from these, I develop a definition. A common good, I argue, is a good that can exist only for a group of persons, and for none of them separately, and the realization of which forms part of the personal good of each. A political community, the argument continues, has such a common good, the “public good.” An individual person's happiness, in fact most of one's identity, can exist only within the particular social fabric that states provide. We are political animals in the sense that living well, the human way, metaphysically presupposes the state.

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“Personhood in the Family: An Examination of Philosophical and Anthropological Perspectives through History and the Continued Relevance of the Family in the 21st Century” The concept of personhood within the family has evolved throughout history, especially with respect to the roles and responsibilities that each member has. From both philosophical and anthropological perspectives this has been impacted by the development of the concept of personhood and the changing value that this has had in our society, particularly in the West. Tracing the development of family structures reveals shifts in defining personhood within familial contexts. From the communal ties of pre-modern societies to the rigid roles of the Victorian era, the notion of personhood evolved in tandem with socio-cultural transformations. The relevance of this topic persists in the 21st century with technological advancements, globalization, and shifting social norms continuing to influence familial dynamics, prompting ongoing reflections on the nature of personhood within the family unit. Drawing insights from Catholic philosophers such as Karol Wojtyła, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and others, this paper will explore how their writings illuminate the intrinsic dignity and relational nature of personhood within familial bonds. By examining historical trajectories and philosophical insights, this paper will seek to underscore the enduring relevance of understanding personhood in the family, examining valuable perspectives for navigating contemporary challenges and enriching familial relationships in the modern era.

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“An Ontology and Anthropology of the Imago: Implications for Human Behavior” This presentation sets out a relational anthropology of the person supported by relational ontology of the cosmos. On this ontology, existence is a matter of reciprocal relations among *different* entities, beginning with the recognition that world is radically different from its grounding source yet in necessary relation with it (Aquinas, Maimonides, Cusanus, Milbank, Pannenberg, Edith Stein, etc.). These are the realities of existence. The grammar of being is distinction-amid-relation. Persons exist within this grammar and so human nature too is distinction-amid-relation. Additionally, humanity is in the (metaphorical) image of the very grounding source from which distinction-amid-relation emerges. Human nature, one might say, is doubly distinction-amid-relation, from both cosmic ontology and human anthropology. If this is the case— if interdependence among different entities is the *ontos*—then, arguing from both Aristotle and biology, the *telos* entails seeing and seeing *to* the layers and networks of relations that enable us to exist and form who we are. This ontos-telos argument has significant implications for human ethical, economic, and political commitments, both to those proximate and in our paths of global connectedness. These commitments will be explored in the work of Levinas, Rosenzweig, Heschel, Christine Hayes, Catherine Keller, and Eugene Borowitz, among others.

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“What Makes a Personalist? Some Psychological Considerations” The Austro-British philosopher Karl Popper argued that information about the source of a proposition cannot by itself determine the truth of the proposition, or as he would have said, its verisimilitude to the truth. This must be judged based on its own merits, that is, the scope and degree of its corroboration. However, the process of corroboration typically involves sorting and selecting possible evidence, and it is at this point that, practically speaking, the person arguing the case for a proposition or, more broadly, a philosophical stance comes under the influence of psychological forces and processes which can have profound effects on their beliefs. This paper will argue that knowledge of such processes helps us understand the preference of individuals for personalist and non-personalist philosophical or theological positions. More specifically, three key social motivations, dominance, attachment, and conscience, will be described and their effects on thinking about such stances, and the selection and marshalling of evidence will be discussed. It will be proposed that powerful non-rational processes are at work to shape our fundamental convictions in a way that complements rather than contradicts Popper’s arguments about how we are to pursue the truth.

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“The Will Reveals the Person - Karol Wojtyła and Psychology of Will” Karol Wojtyła repeatedly referred to psychological research related to the so-called psychology of the will. Psychological research on the will, which began in the early the twentieth century in Belgium and Germany, found continuation, among others, in the study of Polish psychologists (including M. Dybowski, A. Mielczarska, J. Reutt). By the 1950s, the research indicated (with the support of research on hesitation) that specific structures in man responsible for the decision cannot be reduced to environmental, cultural factors, etc. Based on experiments and introspective descriptions, researchers indicated that the irreducible core of what we can call a person is revealed at the moment of decision-making. In this context, Wojtyła’s remarks on the very achievements of the school of Psychology of the Will are noteworthy. Indeed, a well-known foundation of Wojtyła’s personalism indicates that the act reveals the person. However, it should be noted that there is a moment of choice before the act, which is revealed by psychological research on the will itself. In my lecture, I want to point out three issues: (1) how the moment of decision reveals the person (also in light of modern psychological research); (2) the influence of the psychology of the will on Wojtyła’s early philosophy; (3) the influence of the psychology of the will on Wojtyła’s personalism.

Krzysztof Pięta <krzysztof.pietak@student.uw.edu.pl> University of Warsaw

“Qualia and Persons: How Might They Be Related?” In the recent years, many attempts have been made to demonstrate that property dualism, according to which the fact that qualia do exist is relevant, either to substance dualism, or to a broadly understood kind of personalism. I shall argue that what underlies those two lines of reasoning is an argumentative strategy, that should be stated *explicitly*, although it is already *implicitly* at work. My purpose is to articulate the strategy clearly and unambiguously, as encapsulated in the following reasoning: (1) it turned out that the existence of qualia is incompatible with physicalism; (2) the existence of qualia is the less controversial thesis among theses traditionally held by idealists/spiritualists, such as the existence of God, soul/personality, teleology, “higher values,” libertarian free will, and so forth; (3) therefore, independently of the controversy with physicalism, qualia should play the role of a new argumentative starting point for a new defense of idealism/spiritualism. I will detect the impact of this syllogism in the context of the issue concerning persons, in the reasonings of contemporary substance dualists, idealists and spiritualists (D. Zimmermann, J. Lowe, G. Strawson). In the remainder, I will defend this argumentative strategy as both logically valid and pragmatically effective.

Diana Prokofyeva <dianaprokofyeva@gmail.com> St. Petersburg Electrotechnical University (Russia)

“The View of Person by Erich Fromm and Metropolitan Anthony Bloom: What Is in Common?”

A problem of Person, her existence and questions raised by this existence, became actual in the 20th century. On the one hand, a person strives for unity with other people; on the other hand, along with the process of understanding the world and inclusion in it, a person tries not only to preserve her identity, but also to assert her “Self.” At the objective level, this leads to the emergence of interpersonal alienation, and at the metaphysical level to a strengthening of the alienated state of the person oneself. Society may postulate the existence and importance of these problems, but the actions taken often only mask them instead of solving. Humanistic philosophy contains attempts to overcome the barrier of alienation, to go beyond personal space as a kind of “barricade.” According to the humanistic approach, ontologically a person is initially open to this communication and perceives the other as an equal, despite possible differences in views, lifestyle, etc. Erich Fromm in his humanistic works analyzes modern society and the reasons that led to the phenomenon of alienation and people’s isolation on the metaphysical level. During the same period of time, a bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church, Anthony Bloom, focused his view on the revelation of the mystery of a person through her encounter with God. And they both spoke about the overcoming of the alienated state of a person. I propose to turn to the legacy of these thinkers, who paid so much attention to the person. The purpose of my essay is to show the common ground in the humanistic views of Erich Fromm and Anthony Bloom. This could help to see the closeness/points of intersection of humanistic philosophy and Orthodox views on a person using the example of the views of these thinkers.

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“Are Mortals Persons?” There have been a number of scholars who have attempted to equate Heidegger’s *Dasein* to a person. Most, if not all, of these attempts have drawn their analysis from Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. Although there are some helpful interpretative clues that one can draw from the early works of Heidegger, his later writings have a more urgent issue that calls for thinking. The question most thought provoking in Heidegger’s later writings is: “are mortals persons?” In order to determine if mortals can be thought of as persons, we need to consult the work *Relational Personalism* by Harold H. Oliver. In this work, not only does Oliver attempt a new, broader understanding of personalism, but he suggests four principles that structure his *relational personalism*. These four principles are: (1) experience is all there is; (2) experience is a unity; (3) experience consists exhaustively as relating; and (4) that mutuality is the prime feature of being. Within this structure, the person is viewed as relational, and the concept of a foundation, substance, or atemporal structure is jettisoned. In other words, the ‘person’ is the *Dasein* of these experiences, and *Dasein* is the ecstatic, hermeneutical structure of mortals in the later Heidegger. Further, Oliver invokes Erazim Kohák’s idea that this relational structure has a moral character to it which would parallel Heidegger’s thinking of sheltering. This moral relation to the Earth or sheltering of the world, in the end, is a mirror-play or a dance within the unity of these relations.

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“From Garden of Eden to Garden of Gethsemane: Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Ethics of Incommensurability as a Justification of Loving as Critical Thinking” Traditionalist views on ethics often overemphasize intellectualist moral principles, neglecting the interiority of the person. Dietrich von Hildebrand critiques this approach, arguing that it treats individuals externally through Aristotelian categories. His ethics of incommensurability addresses this flaw by integrating the reality of loving into critical thinking. This paper critically evaluates traditional ethics through Hildebrand’s ethics, positing that

it offers a comprehensive response to the neglect of interiority in traditional ethical discourse. It explores how Hildebrand's framework justifies the inclusion of love in critical thinking, challenging the reductionist tendencies of traditionalist ethics. By examining the interplay between ethical commensurability and the personal dimension of love, this study aims to demonstrate that critical thinking must encompass intellectual rigor and the value of loving. This paper attempts to address the question: how can Dietrich von Hildebrand's ethics of incommensurability justify the consideration of loving in critical thinking? This exploration reveals that Hildebrand's approach provides a robust ethical framework that acknowledges the full complexity of the human person, thereby enriching critical thinking with a deeper understanding of love's ethical significance.

Rocco Sacconaghi <r.sacconaghi@gmail.com> DePaul University (Chicago, USA)

“Logical and Methodological Implications of the Concept of Person” In my paper, I intend to explore the impact of a personalistic interpretation of the human being and reality in general on the idea of philosophy. How does the concept of personhood change the understanding of logic and, therefore, the “philosophical act”? First, I will consider how a radical personalistic perspective implies the transcendental primordality of the structure I-Thou-(We) at a cognitive and ethical level. I will then briefly show how a proper understanding of this structure reshapes the conception of logic. Once the implications of the notion of person have emerged, the following questions become unavoidable: is philosophy possible, necessary, and sufficient (autonomous)? Drawing from authors like Blaise Pascal, Gabriel Marcel, Charles Péguy, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, I will respond to these questions showing how philosophy, though not sufficient/autonomous (and thus requiring a constant dialogue with arts, poetry, sciences, theology, politics, etc.), is still possible (because the totality of reality is a possible object of knowledge), and necessary (because knowledge of the totality, i.e., what we call truth, remains a problem). In conclusion, I will briefly mention the fundamental elements of a philosophical method in light of the concept of “person.”

Kevin Schilbrack <schilbrackke@appstate.edu> Appalachian State University (North Carolina, USA)

“Emergent Personhood and Moral Realism” Several philosophers have recently argued that the concept of emergence can help us develop an account of persons that avoids both (1) reductive accounts that identify persons with only their biological components and (2) dualist accounts that treat persons as souls-in-bodies. I will argue that they are right: emergence can explain intentionality and other psychological capacities of personhood. However, what about the moral worth of a person? Moral worth is not a capacity, but a value. In this paper, I propose that by drawing on the enactivist cognition of Francisco Varela and the expansive naturalism of John McDowell, an emergentist philosophy can also develop a realist account of the moral worth of the person.

Nikos Skuras <nikospadre@gmail.com> Pfarrer Spanische Pfarrei Aachen (Germany)

“Homo Sapiens - Homo Reditus” Today's world longs for true peace. Peace does not depend on “lack of war.” Its foundation is the proper interpretation and respect for the *dignitas personae humanae*. The wisdom of the ancient Greeks was expressed in the search for truth about human beings and the world around them. They achieved this primarily within themselves. This is expressed in one of the Delphic inscription: “know thyself.” Because only in this way can a person recognize his own vocation, that is, the life role that the great Director - the Creator - has destined for him. The birth of Christ is the arrival and gift of peace to “people, object of His love” (Luke 2:14). The fullness of time has come. The fulfillment of the promises revealed in the Old Testament and the opening of the way to the fullness of humanity. The culture of

European nations emerged on three foundations. These are: Greek philosophy, Roman law, and Christian ethics. However, the Enlightenment era marked the beginning of a departure from these three pillars. Descartes' "*cogito ergo sum*" was the beginning of a new anthropology. Human thought, not the Creator, was placed at its center. Today, there is a need for humans to return to their roots, to properly interpret the code that has been inscribed within each of us. The guide on this journey can only be the One without whom persons cannot understand themselves or the world around them. That One is Jesus Christ.

Olav Bryant Smith <> California State University Chico

"American Personalist Roots and a Personalist Framework for Today" Personalism can be a force for great good in the world. But to be as effective as we could be, we need to be as inclusive as we can be. The Toward that end, I look back to the roots of personalism in America, beginning with Ralph Waldo Emerson's travels to Europe where he befriended Romantic poets, who helped Emerson appreciate the idealism that was coming from Germany, and particularly Schelling. Personalist roots in America and in Europe wind back to Schelling. Kierkegaard heard Schelling's lectures and was part of a personalist response to Hegel. Emerson learned Schelling indirectly, but this helped to fuel his personalist ideal of trusting oneself to be a voice for the disclosure of truth. That human beings have this power and responsibility added to the sense of human rights and dignity widely being nurtured in America. But Emerson's personalism was limited. Amos Bronson Alcott, while sharing Emerson's respect for persons the transcendental potential of persons, pushed back against Emerson for years in the Transcendentalist Club. Alcott suggested that Emerson's sense of the Divine was too impersonal. The question is always whether Emerson's philosophy is too Hegelian. The same can be said of the American poet Walt Whitman, for whom all rivers flow back into the one ocean. But I see in Whitman the true arena for personalist discussion even today. Whitman, like Alcott and Emerson, clearly stood against the reduction of the self to physicalist explanations. The real question was the stand Emerson and Whitman would take in defending the personality of the individual person within the context of social life, including the cosmic community. I will argue that the concerns about Whitman fall away if we interpret his vision of rivers and oceans as panentheist rather than a pantheist. And given his overriding concern for the songs we sing of ourselves and how they need to be brought to play within the context of democratic institutions, Whitman, who was the first American to call himself a personalist through his essay "Personalism" in 1868, establishes the framework for American personalism that stretches through to the prophetic, democratic voice of Martin Luther King, Jr. Whitman was not a professional philosopher. Personalist discussions between Bowne, Royce, and James were needed to develop the idea of what personalism is. But we would do well to not draw the line of personalism too narrowly around these particular philosophers, given the continuing personalist responsibility in the world. The broad framework of Whitman, who stood for the dignity and rights of persons against all forms of impersonalism, should be the framework within which we still work today if we are to have as great an effect on the world as possible.

Kelly Swope <swopek@miamioh.edu> Thomas More University (Kentucky, USA)

"The Right to Grow Up: How U.S. Education Law Views the Personhood of Children" This paper reexamines *Plyler v. Doe* (1982), a Supreme Court case that spotlights the American cognitive dissonance of denying positive educational rights while mandating universal compulsory schooling. The central question in *Plyler* is whether the U.S. Constitution grants equal protection to undocumented children who seek to attend public schools. The Court's answer is a definitive yes, and I show how the rationale for that yes goes through a *child-centered conception of personhood* that emphasizes children's need for formative guardianship aimed at societal incorporation. Then, I argue that this child-centered conception of personhood implicitly entails a *human right to grow up* that encompasses both universal compulsory schooling during childhood and sustained civic incorporation throughout adulthood. For support, I draw

evidence primarily from the Court's majority opinion and secondarily from immigration policies that shape the lives of undocumented people who remain in the United States after completing their required schooling. The human right to grow up that I discover in *Plyler v. Doe* reveals the practical possibility – not to mention the desirability – of a legal reconstruction of the U.S. education system in a manner consistent with its own internal democratic commitments as well as international conventions on human rights.

Armando Medina Vargas <armandomedinavargas2@gmail.com> Studium Teologicum Galilaeae (Israel)

Discovering the Ontological Status of the human person in his actions, Karol Wojtyła carries out a profound analysis that unveils the primordial status of man. Following the philosophical research method of phenomenology, Wojtyła discovers that it is through his actions that man most clearly reveals and manifests his individual-personal self. Therefore, this would be the way - according to the Pope - to know who the person is. For this reason, John Paul II will study the acts that are most significant, i.e., those that reveal the deepest essence of the human person, his primordial being, his being in its natural, original state. All these acts, which are described in the book of Genesis, pass through and are realized in the human body, a sexed body open to a relationship with the other, a relationship of self-giving: a body that is masculine or feminine. That is why the book of Genesis says: "So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them." (Gen. 1: 27).

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"The Personalist Significance of Schelling's Ecstasy of Reason" The concept of "ecstasy of reason" plays a key role in Schelling's late philosophy in the transition from his negative to his positive philosophy. The 24th lecture of the *Presentation of the Purely Rational Philosophy* is the most explicit text of how the ecstasy of reason brings about the turn to positive philosophy. In the context of Schelling's overall philosophy, the 24th lecture is remarkable for being explicitly focused on the experiential viewpoint of the individual person, as opposed to the speculative self-development of reason. As I will argue, Schelling's emphasis on the personal viewpoint in this text means we should understand the ecstasy of reason to have a deeply personalist significance as well. On both a theoretical and existential level, ecstatic reason denotes a release from impersonal reason, and signifies the personal encounter with the facticity of reality; ultimately, it is the encounter with another person and God in a dialogical I-Thou relation. Interpreting Schelling's ecstasy of reason in personalistic terms suggests a broader personalistic dimension to Schelling's late philosophy as a whole. It also provides a relevant insight for today, that on a fundamental level, reason cannot capture the personal perspective and the encounter with reality as a Thou.

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"Wang Chong's Epistemology of Heaven and Immortality" In this article, I delineate Eastern Han philosopher Wang Chong's (王充, 27 C.E. – ca. 97 C.E.) critical epistemology of the notions of Heaven (*T'ien* 天) and Immortality (*xian* 仙). His pertinent concerns are whether spontaneous nature and creation are continuous with Heaven, and whether the man can accomplish a self-accomplishment to become an Immortal and then to ascend to Heaven. Based on his principle of purely spontaneous naturalism, Wang Chong's concept of Heaven provides ingenious insights into the naturalism characterized by a self-generating organism, instead of a relatedness to an anthropomorphic deity. In line with a universal moral view of consequent uniqueness within the all-embracing concept of the person, Wang Chong's critical

thought of Immortality offers a conception that seems much more in line with his explanation of the Daoist view on the self-cultivation of virtues and a naturalized imitation of the Way (*Tao* 道). In sum, Wang Chong's rhetorical style toward testimonial evidence can be considered as an innate basis for guiding early natural and moral reasoning for the sake of characterizing truth nature.

Dominika Żukowska-Gardzińska <d.zukowska-gardzinska@mt514.pl> The Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University (Warsaw, Poland)

“Personalistic Modeling” The pastoral experience of Rev. Karol Wojtyła - John Paul II indicated to him that people of all generations pose questions on the same or similar topics: elementary truths about man, the meaning of existence, the sources and limits of love. Unfortunately, the answers are built on partial truths reducing man to consciousness, freedom, sexuality, emotionality. However, Christ called us to return to the beginning, that is, to the mystery of the creation of a human, man and woman, in the search for these answers. Christ points us to seek the truth that man is a subject who determines his own actions in the light of the integral truth about himself. This personalistic cognition flows from the insight into the originality and uniqueness of every human being, from the experience of his irreducibility to the level of the world. It flows from the experience of man's functioning in relation to man, but develops and is complemented by the integration with the man-God relationship. Through the communion with persons, God becomes visible to the world. Only then does the meaning of the words “creation of man in the image and likeness of God” become comprehensible. This personalistic view of theology has its concrete consequences in interpersonal communication. These are the rehumanization of a person rather than dehumanization –the first step of the personalistic norm in practice; the irreducibility of the person to consciousness, freedom, sexuality, emotionality; acceptance of a person, despite their differences; reference to common values –the search for what is just, good and true.

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